Part Ten Excerpts from ANTO KNEZEVIC'S AN ANALYSIS OF SERBIAN PROPAGANDA The "balance" of readers' letters One of the most prestigious newspapers in the world, The New York Times, has on the whole reported on the conflict in Croatia without much visible influence of anti-Croatian propaganda. The New York Times unambiguously condemned the Serbian aggression from the beginning, which is evident just by looking at the titles of editorials: "Serbia vs. the New World Order" (August 14, 1991); "The Sacking of Croatia" (September 22, 1991); "Serbia's Spiteful War" (November 6, 1991); "De-Recognize Yugoslavia" (December 18, 1991). Of course, the editorial position of the New York daily newspaper was underscored by the official American position that Serbia's conduct represented "out-right military intervention against Croatia," as Secretary of State James A. Baker described the conflict before the Security Council of the United Nations: "The apparent objective of the Serbian leadership and the Yugoslav military working in tandem is to create a 'small Yugoslavia' or 'Greater Serbia', which would exclude Slovenia and a rump Croatia. This new entity would be based on the kind of repression which Serbian authorities have exercised in Kosovo for several years." ("Bush's Yugoslav Policy Shifts to Serbs," The New York Times, September 27, 1991, p. A4.) However, the editors at times apply a "balanced" principle to the letters of readers. This is understandable, since letters as a rule show events from one side, while newspapers should show both sides in a conflict. So, for example, two letters about the war in Croatia are published in The New York Times on September 16, 1ency is more than evident. Morin is unreliable in the facts, and that is the first thing that strikes the reader. So, for example, he writes that the Turks took Constantinople in 1459, whereas the Byzantine capital actually fell in 1453. Morin asserts that Austria annexed. Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1909, but the annexation was carried out in 1908. Morin mentions the head of the Independent State of Croatia five times and he spells his name wrong five times, as Pavlevic. (The head of the pro-Nazi "New Serbia general Milan Nedic, is not written incorrectly - because Nedic is not even mentioned.) If someone makes use of incorrect historical facts, it is hardly likely that the interpretation based on those facts will be more correct. Let us cite some interpretations which Morin offers the French public as if they are unquestionable and correct: "Some Muslims, enlisted by the SS or by Pavlevic, massacred Serbs, and the Chetniks massacred Muslims." Here the same propaganda technique used by Teddy Preuss in The Jerusalem Post is in action: a terminological shift. Morin uses the national name of those who carried out massacres of the Serbs (in this case, Muslims), while those who carried out massacres of the Muslims are not identified by their national name (Serbs), but rather by the name of one armed formation (Chetniks). Another propaganda technique is also present here: the order of listing the crimes. The Muslims who killed Serbs are mentioned in the first place, and only then the Chetniks who killed Muslims. Thus the more numerous Chetnik killings seem to be justified as revenge for the allegedly first-murdered Serbs. Morin's "objectivity" comes to the surface in the next sentence: "Some Croats, Slovenes and Muslims were "pro-German" during the war because they were anti-Serbian and for a time they saw their new oppressors as liberators." Here we see the third propaganda technique in action, the one used by Semeniuk in Novoe Russkoe Slovo: it is not enough to blacken the Croats alone, one must blacken other peoples too, and especially those who have a real chance of achieving international recognition of their independence. And those are, in this case, the peoples of the republics of Croatia Slovenia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. Morin's "reflections" offer French readers historical revisionism. He ignores the fact that one of the strongest (if not the strongest) anti-fascist resistance movements in Europe was precisely on the soil of these three republics, under the Croat Tito's leadership. Morin does not mention the fact that the Serbian government of general Nedic was also pro-Nazi. If French historians, proud of the role of de Gaulle in the Second World War, do not forget that Petain existed as well, why then does Morin neglect the Serbian Petain, Pavelic's counterpart? Why too does he neglect the Serbian fascist phalanges from Dimitrije Ljotic's "Zbor"? Morin compares the position of Kosovo's majority Albanians with the position of the Serbian minority in Croatia. Unfortunately, this French admirer of Serbian writer Milos Crnjanski offers no coherent support for his comparison. He accepts the following Serbian estimation of the number of Serbian victims during World War 11: "The Serbs estimate the number of their people massacred by the Ustashe at seven hundred thousand. This number, contested by the current Croatian president Tudjman, could be revised downwards." As we already saw, there are many Serbian estimations of the number of their war victims. These estimations differ significantly and contradict one to another. The figure of 700,000 Serbian victims is only one of them. It is interesting to note that Morin does not mention any Croatian estimation of Croatian victims from that period. Why does the French expert pass over the Croatian victims in silence? Morin writes that "it is Serbia that is the principle victim of the centrifugal forces" in former Yugoslavia, forgetting that the Croats too are scattered throughout other republics. According to the French scholar, the plurality of residents in Bosnia-Hercegovina are "a Muslim nation, although Serb in origin." We know the source of the assertion on the Serbian ancestry of the Bosnian Muslims, but we do not know any facts which might support it. And so on, through the columns of the French press.